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Eight years ago, our country was still
coming to grips with the worst
terrorist attacks in our history. We
shed tears for those we lost. We
prayed for those still missing. We
wondered whether the next wave of
terrorist attacks was only days or
weeks away.
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advice that their activities were
lawful.
of office, as
President
Obamadid in
January, we
can expect
many of those
policies to
change.

Policy differences are nothing new in
our democracy, but prosecution of
those policy differences represents a
dangerous and disturbing
development. Attorney General Eric
Holder has launched a potentially
open-ended special counsel
After 9/11, our country developed
investigation into the post-9111 CIA
many new policies to fight and win
interrogation program. This
this Global War on Terror. These
policies, then as now, should be open investigation could result in
to debate by the American people, and prosecutions of career intelligence
professionals, as well as the lawyers
subject to the review of their
who gave them good-faith legal
representatives in Congress. When a
Fall2009

Mexico and Latin America: The "Achilles
Heel" in Our National Security and
Counterterrorism Mission

Prosecutions of Bush Administration
officials might be popular with several
left-wing fringe groups, but I had
hoped that the Obama Administration
would resist their influence. Earlier
this year, White House Chief of Staff
Rahm Emanuel said "This is not a
time to use our energy and our time in
looking back, and in a sense of anger
and retribution." Other top
Administration officials, including
CIA Director Leon Panetta and
Homeland Security Secretary Janet
Napolitano, offered similar views.
I have offered a Sense of the Senate
resolution that expresses what most
Americans believe to be true: we
should not criminalize differences in
policy, nor prosecute those who gave
good-faith legal advice, nor punish
See TERRORISM Pg. 4
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maritime, nuclear and chemical. We,
as a country, have come to realize that
we must protect not only our nuclear
weapons and stockpiles, but also our
nuclear waste. We must protect our
airliners, and our ships and ports. And
By Peter Conner & John T. Hicks
we must protect the thousands of
Since September 11, 200 1, the idea of chemical facilities that are spread
security has drastically shifted. The
throughout the country. Thousands of
concept of terrorist attacks that did not chemicals criss-cross this country to
involve the perpetrators attempting to and from these facilities by air, rail
smuggle contraband weapons and
and road.
bombs into the country, but rather,
Fortunately, Congress, after
using our own society against us, has establishing the Department of
radically altered the way we view
Homeland Security (DHS) and
security. This view of security has
addressing the daunting task of
manifested itself in increased, and
confronting the many security issues
novel, security innovations in many
within the country, recognized the
industries, to include aviation,
need to increase the security for these
Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism
Standards: Establishing Risk-Based
Performance Standards for the
Security of Our Nation's Chemical
Facilities

many chemical facilities. The first
step was to identify what chemicals
were potentially dangerous, and then
institute security standards on those
facilities that manufactured, used, and
stored those chemicals. The Chemical
Facility Anti-Terrorism Standard
(CFATS) was authorized by Congress
in the Department of Homeland
Security 2007 Appropriations Act.
The Act provides DHS with the
authority to identify, assess, and
regulate the security of those chemical
facilities that present the greatest risk.
That security risk is a function of:
consequence (the consequence of a
successful attack on a facility);
vulnerability (the likelihood that an
attack on a facility will be successful);
See CFATS Pg. 11
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MEXICO AND LATIN-AMERICA
The "Achilles Heel" in our National Security
and Counterterrorism Mission
by James Conway

by Jeffrey F Addicott*
(The complete law review article will appear
in the Pace Law Review, Winter 2010)

I.

INTRODUCTION

"The views of men can only be known, or guessed at, by
their words or actions. "1
George Washington, 1799
When Barack Obama ran for the office of president of
the United States in the 2008 election against John
McCain, a major campaign slogan was for a cry for
"change." Of course, the promise of change crops up
during practically every presidential campaign in
American history and then quickly fades into oblivion
once the winner takes office. Indeed, in terms of dealing
with the threat of militant Islam posed by al-Qa'eda,
Taliban, and associated forces there can be little question
that in the first six months of his presidency, President
Barrack H. Obama actually retained many key Bush
Administration polices. Paradoxically, apart from
providing additional combat troops on the ground in
Pakistan, President Obama's promised change to, for
example, provide a "new and comprehensive strategy for
Afghanistan and Pakistan"2 to address the threat of
militant Islam never materialized.
See OBAMA Pg. 16

U.S. counterterrorism professionals in Washington, DC and
elsewhere rarely raise an eyebrow when the topic of LatinAmerica and terrorism are lumped in the same sentence. To
most, even those who work the terror target, terrorism and
Latin-America seem mutually exclusive.
When we talk about national security and Latin-America,
issues that normally take priority begin with drug cartels,
paramilitary guerrilla groups, human-smuggling, armstrafficking and kidnappings and extortions of U.S citizens in
the region.
The reality is, although there is an overlap and nexus to each
of these issues and terrorism, the threat of international
terrorism to U.S. targets and the U.S homeland is a "clear and
present danger".
Since 9/11, the FBI and the U.S intelligence community has
drilled down and increased its global surveillance and
analysis of terrorist organizations, their cells and affiliates
and the global linkages between these groups. In this regard,
Latin-America continues to pop up on the radar screen.
While Latin-America will never have the terrorism profile of
many Middle-East, south Asia or east Africa regions, its
proximity to the U.S. and its shared 2,000 mile porous border
with the U.S ., should be of concern for counterterrorism
policy-makers.
We know from intelligence analysis that Al Qaeda (AQ),
Hizballah and other international terrorist organizations are
See MEXICO Pg. 18
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those who relied upon that advice.
The resolution makes clear that a
special counsel investigation
represents a serious abuse of our
system of justice.
The resolution reflects the reality that
the CIA interrogation program was
developed during an extraordinary
time in our nation's history. 9/11 was
less than a year in the past.
Intelligence indicated that al Qaeda
was planning another wave of attacks.
The CIA had several top al Qaeda
operatives in its custody. These
terrorists had revealed some useful
information, but they had stopped
talking. CIA interrogators were
convinced that these al Qaeda agents
had additional information about plans
to attack America and our interests
overseas.

I
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Before using these techniques, they
asked their superiors and the legal
department at the CIA for advice
about the advisability and legality of
these techniques. CIA lawyers, in
turn, engaged their colleagues in the
White House as well as the
Department of Justice's Office of
Legal Counsel, or OLC.
Lawyers in each of these agencies
wrestled earnestly with the difficult
questions presented by enhanced
interrogation techniques. They
acknowledged that these questions
were "substantial and difficult." They
looked at the law closely - and
ultimately concluded that some of
these techniques did not violate
federal laws against torture.

Enhanced interrogation techniques
may appear controversial today, but at
the time they received the full support
The CIA at the time was under
of appropriate members of Congress.
tremendous bipartisan pressure to
When she was ranking member on the
increase its counterterrorism efforts
House Intelligence Committee, for
and prevent the next terrorist attack.
example, Speaker Nancy Pelosi was
The House and Senate Intelligence
briefed on waterboarding and other
Committees had concluded that the
interrogation techniques. Not only did
intelligence community did not
she and other intelligence committee
"demonstrate sufficient initiative in
members not object to these practices
coming to grips with the new
at the time, they fully funded them
transnational threats" in the days
through the appropriations process,
and repeatedly asked the CIA if the
before 9/ 11 . The CIA wanted to do
the most it could, under the law, to get agency needed more support to carry
the information our leaders needed to out its mission against al Qaeda.
keep us safe.
These techniques were approved by
Our intelligence professionals
both Democrats and Republicans, and
they saved lives. Recently a 2004
believed that enhanced interrogation
techniques could prompt some al
CIA Inspector General report was
Qaeda operatives to divulge additional released to the public. The report
information. Specifically, they
details the interrogation techniques
wanted to use techniques that the
that our front-line CIA interrogators
military uses in its Survival, Evasion, used, as well as the extensive legal
Resistance and Escape, or SERE,
analysis and supervision under which
training- including waterboarding.
these interrogations were carried out.
4

The report concludes that these
enhanced interrogation techniques
yielded results that saved American
lives.
Nevertheless, the program had flaws.
The Inspector General report details
activities by some intelligence
personnel that career prosecutors in
the Bush Administration determined
were criminal violations of law.
These individuals have been
prosecuted, convicted, and punished.
Since then, career Justice Department
prosecutors, as well as CIA leadership
in two administrations, have reviewed
the Inspector General report, and
independently concluded that no
further prosecutions are appropriate.
CIA Director Leon Panetta put it best
earlier this year. He said, "The
Department of Justice has had the
complete IG report since 2004. Its
career prosecutors have examined that
document-and other incidents from
Iraq and Afghanistan-for legal
accountability. They worked carefully
and thoroughly, sometimes taking
years to decide if prosecution was
warranted or not. In one case, the
Department obtained a criminal
conviction of a CIA contractor. In
other instances, after Justice chose not
to pursue action in court, the Agency
took disciplinary steps of its own."
The decisions of career prosecutors
and CIA supervisors should be
respected . Our nation's intelligence
gathering capabilities and national
security should be preserved. In the
coming weeks, I hope the United
States Senate will adopt my resolution
calling for an end to political
prosecutions, and that the Justice
Department will heed that call.
Fall2009
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Back in 2004, STRATFOR
began publishing reports
noting that militants primarily Islamist militants
- were changing their target
set. We observed that after
9/ 11 , increased situational
awareness and security
measures at hard targets like
U.S. government or military
facilities were causing
militants to gravitate
increasingly toward more
vulnerable soft targets, and
that hotels were particularly
desirable targets. Indeed, by
striking an international hotel
in a major city, militants can
make the same kind of
statement against the West as
they can by striking an
embassy. Hotels are often full
of Western business travelers,
diplomats and intelligence
officers. This makes them
target-rich environments for
militants seeking to kill
Westerners and gain
international media attention
without having to penetrate
the extreme security of a hard
target like a modern embassy.

In early 2005, STRATFOR
began writing about another
trend we observed: the
devolution of al Qaeda and
the global jihadist movement
from an organizational model
based on centralized
leadership and focused global
goals to a more amorphous
model based on regional
franchises with local goals
and strong grassroots
support. As a result of this
change, the less professional
local groups receive less
training and funding. They
often are unable to attack
hard targets and therefore
tend to focus on softer targets
- like hotels.
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are once again updating the
study.

The most likely method of
attack against a hotel is still
an improvised explosive
device (lED), whether
vehicle-borne (VBIED),
planted ahead oftime or
deployed by a suicide
bomber in a public area.
However, after the Mumbai
attacks, the risk of a
guerrilla-style armed assault,
including the use of highpowered assault rifles and
explosives against multiple
targets within a given radius,
became quite high. The
relative success of the
Mumbai operation and the
dramatic news coverage it
Following several attacks
against hotels in 2005 received (it captured the
most notably the multiple
world 's attention for three
bombing attacks in Amman, days) mean that copycat
Jordan, and Sharm e)-Sheikh, attacks can be expected.
Egypt - we updated our
Additionally, attacks
2004 study on the threat to
targeting specific YIPs
hotels to include tactical
remain a possibility, and
details on these attacks. Now, hotels are likely venues for
following the November
such attacks.
2008 Mumbai attacks and the The Shift to Soft Targets
July 2009 Jakarta attacks, we

One of the important results
of the Sept. 11 attacks was
the substantial increase in
counterterrorism programs,
including security measures
and countersurveillance
around government and
military facilities in response
to the increased threat
environment. The attacks had
a similar impact at U.S. and
foreign airports. The
effective "hardening" of such
facilities -which in the past
had topped the list of
preferred targets for mil itant
attacks - has made largescale strikes against such
targets measurably more
difficult.
As a result, there has been a
rise in attacks against lowerprofile "soft targets" defined generally as public or
semi-public (some degree of
restricted access) facilities
where large numbers of
people congregate under
relatively loose security. Soft
targets include various forms
of public transportation,
shopping malls, corporate
offices, places ofworship,
See HARD TARGETS Pg. 6

Fall2009

5

'I
schools and sports venues, to name a
few.

attack, which killed six people
and injured six more.

Between the first World Trade Center
(WTC) bombing on Feb. 26, 1993, and
the second attack on Sept. 11, 2001, a!
Qaeda focused primarily on hitting hard
targets, including:

Nov. 26, 2008: Attackers armed
with rifles and grenades
stormed the Oberoi Trident and
Taj Mahal Palace hotels in
Mumbai, India. Over the course
of the three-day siege, 71
people were killed and more
than 200 were injured. The
attackers belonged to the
militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba.

Nov. 13, 1995: A U.S.-Saudi
military facility in Riyadh,
Saudi Arabia, where two
VBIEDs exploded. Seven
people, including five
Americans, were killed.
Aug. 7, 1998: U.S. embassies in
Nairobi, Kenya, and Dares
Salaam, Tanzania, were attacked
with large VBIEDs. More than
250 people were killed and
5,000 injured.
Oct. 12, 2000: The USS Cole
was attacked with a suicide lED
in a small boat while harbored
in a Yemeni port. Seventeen
sailors were killed in the attack.
After Sept. 11, there was a marked shift
in attacks consistent with one of a!
Qaeda's key strengths: adaptability. The
enumeration of a! Qaeda-linked militant
strikes since then reads like a laundry
list of soft targets. While there have also
been attacks - both foiled and
successful- against harder targets like
embassies since Sept. 11, the present
trend of attacking softer targets (and
specifically hotels) is unmistakable.
Since the start of2008, we have seen
the following attacks:

•

July 17, 2009: Two suicide
bombers belonging to a Jemaah
Islamiyah splinter group
detonated IEDs nearly
simultaneously in the adjacent
JW Marriott and Ritz-Carlton
hotels in Jakarta, Indonesia.
Nine people were killed and 42
were wounded in the attacks.
The bombs had been assembled
in the hotel room of the JW
Marriott where one of the
attackers had been staying. This
trend toward seeking out soft
targets will continue as Islamist
militant cells become even more
autonomous and "grassroots"
jihadists (al Qaeda sympathizers
who may lack training or direct
connection to al Qaeda but are
dangerous nonetheless) become
more numerous in various
regions. The emergence of
regional a! Qaeda franchises
such al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb and a! Qaeda in Iraq in
recent years has further
supported this trend.
STRATFOR has even begun to
see these regional franchises
develop more autonomous and
localized cells.

The downside of hitting soft targets,
from the jihadists' perspective, is that
such strikes usually have limited
Jan. 14, 2008: At approximately political and ideological mileage.
6:30p.m. local time, three
Islamist militants prefer targets with
militants opened fire on security high symbolic value, but they have
guards with AK-47s and hand
proved willing to forego some degree of
grenades on the perimeter of the symbolism in exchange for a higher
Serena Hotel in Kabul,
chance of success. Attacks against
Afghanistan. A suicide bomber
certain soft targets, such as synagogues
then made his way inside the
and large Western hotels, can at times
hotel before detonating the lED provide the necessary combination of
he was wearing. A local Tali ban symbolism and a high (primarily
spokesman quickly claimed the Western and Jewish) body count.

The Threat to Hotels

Hotels are the quintessential "soft
targets." The nature ofthe hospitality
business necessitates a level of
openness in hotels. Not only guests
staying in rooms there but also patrons
using facilities such as bars, gyms and
boutiques (which are often only found
in large, luxury hotels in developing
countries and attract a western clientele)
expect to enter and leave the hotels
freely - something that greatly hinders
the ability to monitor who is entering
and leaving a hotel. It is also not
uncommon to see unattended luggage in
lobbies or even unattended cars in
driveways of luxury hotels - giving
militants more opportunities to plant
explosive devices.
Although hotel security workers do
occasionally monitor and confront
suspicious loiterers, militants have
found that one way around this is to
check into hotels, which gives them full
access and guest privileges. The
bombers who conducted the July 17
twin suicide bombings ofthe JW
Marriott and the Ritz-Carlton in Jakarta,
Indonesia, had checked into the hotel
two days prior to carrying out the
operation.
For jihadists, the
ideological
justifications for
attacking hotels are
numerous. Large
luxury hotels
catering to
westerners
epitomize the
excesses and
immorality thatjihadists condemn on
religious grounds. Financially, jihadist
attacks on hotels can severely hurt a
country's tourism industry hitting at the
state's revenue stream.
Ultimately, security rests primarily in
the hands of hotel workers and private
security guards. Government security
forces do not have the capacity to
protect hotels -especially in countries
that face a myriad of security threats
(and thereby the countries most likely to
be attacked). However, many large
hotels and hotel chains have been
unwilling to incur the direct costs
See THREAT P . 7
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associated with hardening security, such after 9/11 compared to the number of
fatal ities in the same period before 9111.
as hiring more and better-trained
guards. Guards and other employees are
INJURIES AND FATALI TI ES BEFORE VS . AFTER 9 / 11
rarely trained in countersurveillance
techniques, which could be the most
cost-effective method of preventing an
attack.

Quantifying the Threat
A comparison of the number of major
attacks against hotels in the eight years
before 9111 and the eight years since
provides an interesting illustration of
the trend we have been discussing. For
the purpose of this study, we are
defining a major attack as one in which
one or more IEDs detonated or a hotel
received rocket or mortar fire; an armed
assault (like Mumbai); or a non-lED or
rocket attack that resulted in casualties.
These statistics include only attacks that
could be defined as being perpetrated
by militants (all militants, not just
Islamist militants) or separatist groups.
It does not include attacks conducted by
any country's military forces.
There were major attacks against 30
hotels in 15 different countries in the
eight years preceding 9111 . For
comparison, during the eight years after
9/11 the number of major attacks
against hotels has more than doubled;
62 attacks have occurred in 20 different
countries.

maneuverable as individual suicide
bombers traveling on foot.
Smaller IEDs are proving to be more
effective at killing foreigners because,
although a larger quantity of explosives
will create a larger explosion, the
impact of a blast is determined solely
by placement. If a bomber can carry a
smaller explosive device into the center
of a heavily trafficked area- such as a
hotel lobby or restaurant - it will result
in more casualties than a larger device
detonated farther away from its
intended target.

Attacks using suicide bombers equipped
with smaller IEDs have occurred inside
and outside hotels in Phnom Penh,
Cambodia (July 2001); Jerusalem
(December 2001); Netanya, Israel
2002); Bogota (December
(March
This data clearly shows that hotels have
2002);
Casablanca,
Morocco (May
become increasingly popular soft
2003);
Moscow
(December
2003);
targets for militant groups.
Kathmandu, Nepal (August 2004);
The Tactics
Taba, Egypt (October 2004); Amman,
Hotels figure prominently as targets in a Jordan (November 2005); Peshawar,
Pakistan (May 2007); and Kabul,
long list of successful attacks using
Afghanistan (January 2008).
either VBIEDs or human suicide
bombers. Following the Mumbai
In both types of attacks, the majority of
attacks, armed assaults, assassinations
those killed or injured were just inside
and kidnappings at hotels also should be or outside the hotel lobbies or on the
considered as an increasingly
ground floors, with some impact also to
significant risk for hotels as well.
the hotels' lower floors . Many ofthe
deaths and injuries resulted from flying
IEDs
glass. Protective window film prevents
HOTEL ATTACKS 1993 - 2009 YTO
The most substantial threat comes from
glass from shattering in the event of a
IEDs -- either VBIEDs detonated at
blast; without it, the glass cracks and
hotel entrances, inside a garage or other
falls in large sections. Using window
perimeter locations, or an lED used by a
801- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - film is a cost-effective way of lowering
suicide bomber who aims to detonate
the
death toll in this kind of attack.
701- - - - within a lobby, restaurant or other
Indeed,
from photos we have seen, the
60
public gathering place inside the hotel.
use of protective window film in Jakarta
Against unsecured targets, VBIEDs
seems to have been very effective at
generate the greatest number of
controlling the glass fragments.
casualties. VBIED attacks targeting
Armed Assaults
hotels have occurred in Karachi,
Pakistan (May 2002); Mombasa, Kenya Assaults employing small arms and
grenades have long been a staple of
(November 2002); Jakarta, Indonesia
modern terrorism. Such assaults have
(August 2003); Taba, Egypt (October
2004); Pattani, Thailand (March 2008); been used in many well-known terrorist
attacks conducted by a wide array of
Bouira, Algeria (August 2008);
' . '
Islamabad (September 2008); Peshawar, actors, such as the Black September
The number of people injured in attacks Pakistan (June 2009); and Beledweyne, operation against the Israeli athletes at
the 1972 Munich Olympics; the
Somalia (June 2009).
on hotels after 9111 is nearly six times
December
1975 seizure ofthe
the number of people injured in the
VBIEDs pack a bigger punch but are
Organization
of the Petroleum
eight years before 9/11 . Additionally,
less precise and can be thwarted by
Exporting
Countries
headquarters in
fatalities in hotel attacks have increased putting up vehicle barricades and
Vienna,
led
by
Carlos
the Jackal ; the
six and a half times in the eight years
checkpoints. They also are not as
December 1985 simultaneous attacks
C-ctJI'ithtSfMTfOA2009 - w.STRAUOl.tom

See HOTELS Pg. 8
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HOTELS / continued from pg. 7

against the airports in Rome and Vienna
by the Abu Nidal Organization; and
even the December 2001 attack against
the Indian Parliament building in New
Delhi led by Kashmiri militants.

kidnappings, often followed by murder,
as a symbolic act and, to a lesser
degree, a way of raising funds . Even
high-profile individuals who have
constant security protection while
traveling generally are more vulnerable
Most recently, the Nov. 26, 2008,
assault against the Oberoi-Trident Hotel at hotels than elsewhere. Though
security teams can be deployed ahe~~ of
and the Taj Mahal Hotel in Mumbai,.
time
to protect the sites that YIPs VISit
India, by some 10 militants ar~ed With
during
the day, many times coverage is
automatic rifles and grenades k1lled 71
reduced
when the VIP is considered
people and injured nearly 200 at the
"safe"
in
his or her hotel room.
hotels (though there were many other
The planning and creativity militant
casualties at other sites the gunmen
attacked). This incident showed how an groups could employ in an attack
against a VIP at a hotel should not be
active-shooter situation carried out by
well-trained militants can cause more
underestimated. Such threats can be
casualties than some VBIEDs.
identified and neutralized by the
implementation of the proactive tools of
protective intelligence, which allows a
person to act instead of react to preserve
his or her personal safety.

Security personnel in most hotels
around the world would have been
sorely outgunned in any of these
situations and generally are not
equipped to deal with active-shooter
scenarios. Subsequently, they fall back
on local law enforcement authorities which can be problematic in several
regions around the world. As seen in
Mumbai, inept or inadequately armed
first responders can lead to prolonged
active-shooter situations and lead to
hostage situations as well.
Given the relative success of the
Mumbai operation - in casualties,
negative economic impact,
psychological impact and media
coverage- similar armed assaults are
likely to gain popularity in the jihadis~
community. We anticipate that they will
be employed against hotels and similar
soft targets elsewhere.

Kidnappings and Assassinations
While bombings remain a favored tactic
globally, the number ofkidnappings ~nd
assassinations has increased as Islam1st
militants adapt to changing
circumstances. As events around the
world- particularly in Iraq, North
Africa, Afghanistan and the Philippines
-have shown, jihadists have adopted

•

Assailants wearing gas masks
and armed with assault
weapons, hand grenades and
tear gas would infiltrate the
hotel after midnight -when
they knew protection levels
were lower- and take the
stairs to the YIP's floor,
attacking the target in his room.
Militants would steal hotel
uniforms and infiltrate a
banquet via the catering kitchen,
which is always chaotic.

Follow-up analyses by counterterrorism
authorities determined that these
scenarios would have carried a 90
percent success rate, an? the target~d
VIP - along with multiple protectiOn
agents- would have been killed.

In the aftermath of the New York City
bomb plots, intelligence also indicated
Attacks on YIPs at hotels should not be that elements associated with al Qaeda
thought of as merely theoretical. In fact, had planned to detonate car bombs at
hotels have been onjihadists' radar
hotels where high-value targets were
screens for nearly two decades, as
staying.
evidenced by the New York City
Recommendations
landmark bomb plot. After the first
WTC bombing in 1993, authorities
The first step for large hotel operators in
uncovered several plots that centered on dealing with this threat is to undertake a
attacks against YIPs at the U.N. Plaza
vulnerability assessment to identify
Hotel and the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in
properties that are most likely to be at
New York City. Ramzi Yousef(the
risk. Such an assessment - based
mastermind of the WTC bombing) and
primarily on the geographic location of
the local militant cell had conducted
assets and an understanding of Islamist
extensive surveillance ofthe hotels,
militants' goals, methodologies and
both inside and out, and outlined
areas of operations -will allow
several attack scenarios. It would be
companies to focus their time and
foolish to discount these plans today, as resources on the most vulnerable
al Qaeda is known to return to past
properties, while more generally
targets and scenarios. In the New York
ensuring that security measures do not
plots, operatives had devised the
overshoot or undershoot the threat level
following scenarios:
for a particular property. This allows for
a better, more efficient use of resources.
Using a stolen delivery van, an
attack team would drive the
For high-threat properties, the next step
wrong way down a one-way
is usually a physical security survey to
street near the Waldorf"well,"
identify specific weaknesses and
where VIP motorcades arrived. vulnerabilities. In some cases,
As a diversionary tactic, a lone
diagnostic protective surveillance can
operative would toss a hand
help ensure that properties are not
grenade from the church across currently under hostile surveillance.
the street. A four-man assault
Some kind of ongoing protective
team (a tactic used in al Qaeda
surveillance program is the best means
attacks in Saudi Arabia and
of interdicting hostile actions.
elsewhere) would deploy from
Because ofthe very large number of
the rear of the van and attack
the protection cars and then the potential targets in most locations_, the
implementation of some very ba~1c but
YIP's limousine.
visible measures might be sufficient to
See SECURI'IY P . 9
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SECURITY I continued from pg. 8

send an attacker on to the next possible
target. These security enhancements
include:
A greater number and greater
visibility of guards (including
armed guards) inside and
outside the building.

•

plan is in place to deal with it.
Sound relationships with local
police and other agenciessuch as foreign embassies can help facilitate information
sharing that could uncover
previously unknown threats.
Though authorities might not be
able to spare resources to
monitor a hotel, in many places
they will respond quickly to
reports of suspected
surveillance activity to confront
suspicious people and possibly
head off an operation.

In higher-threat level locations,
use static surveillance around
the hotel's perimeter. In areas of
lesser threats, roving vehicles
patrolling the perimeter at
varying times might be
sufficient to spot suspicious
activity and to deter attackers.

Prominently placed security
The following measures are
cameras around the perimeter
recommended for all areas:
and throughout the hotel. Even
if the tapes are not monitored by
Protective window film: This
guards trained in
should be used throughout the
countersurveillance techniques,
hotel. Because it reduces the
they can help identify
amount of flying glass from
suspicious activity or deter
explosions, it is one of the best
and most cost-effective ways of
hostile surveillance.
minimizing casualties in the
Landscaping in front of and
event
of an attack.
around the hotel that prevents
Protective surveillance: In all
areas, hotel owners should
consider hiring protective
surveillance teams dedicated to
this purpose. There are also
some highly effective resources
available that can be used to
tum a hotel's video cameras into
proactive tools rather than
merely reactive resources.

vehicles from directly
approaching the entrance or
actually entering the building for example, large cement
flower pots that can stop
vehicles, hills with rocks
embedded in them and palm
trees.
Other security measures might be
appropriate in medium- and high-threat
level locations:
If possible, increase the standoff
distance between the hotel and
areas of vehicular traffic.
Physical barricades are among
the most effective deterrents to
VBIEDs, as they help to keep
drivers from crashing through
the doors of a hotel and
detonating explosives in hightraffic areas.

Background checks: The ability
to share guest lists with local
authorities for comparison with
a militant watch list could help
determine if a registered guest is
engaging in preoperational
surveillance. Additionally,
background checks should be
conducted routinely on hotel
employees in an attempt to
weed out possible militants.

•

Employee education: At
minimum, hotels should train
employees, especially doormen
and other ground-level
employees, in basic protective
surveillance techniques.
Liaisons: Maintain a good
working relationship with local
police and other relevant
authorities. Identifying hostile
surveillance is useless unless a

Copyright STRATFOR 2009.
Republished With Permission.
STRATFOR is a global intelligence company
providing published intelligence and
customized intelligence service for private
individuals, global corporations, and
divisions of the US. and foreign governments
around the world.
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FUTURE LEGAL CONFERENCE:

CYBER SECURITY~ LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY? LAW
ENFORCEMENT? AND JPRIVATE INDUSTRY

MARCH 18-19,2010
ST. MARY'S UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS

TOPICS DISCUSSED INCLUDE:
Information on cyber threats from terror groups/nation-states
• Government and private sector partnerships with cyber security
• Mechanisms from law enforcement
• Cyber premises liability for cyber attacks
• Cyberwarfare
• Cyber challenges to critical infrastructure

Registration cost is $150, which includes breakout refreshments and extensive printed
materials, e.g. Terrorism Law: Materials, Cases, Comments (5 1h Ed. 2009). Event
limited to 200 attendees. Please contact Ms. Faithe Campbell at (210) 431-2219 or
fcampbell@stmarytx.edu. Additional information can be found on the Center for
Terrorism Law website: www.stmarytx.edu/ctl.
10

Fa112009

TERRORISM

LAW

REPORT

CFATS I continued from pg. 2

and the threat (the intent and capability of an adversary in
respect to attacking a facility).
Congress, through this legislation, is directing
chemical facilities to undergo a series of risk assessments
aimed at identifying potential terrorist targets. CFATS
identifies about 323 chemicals, called chemicals of interest
or COis. A very important distinction about CFATS is that
it does not just affect the chemical or petrochemical
industries. It includes industries such as chemical
manufacturing, storage and distribution, energy and
utilities, agriculture and food, paints and coatings,
explosives, mining, electronics, plastics and healthcare;
basically any industry which manufactures, uses, or stores
in of the COis listed in CFATS. For now, CFATS does not
apply to facilities under the jurisdiction of the Maritime
Transportation Security Act (MTSA); Department of
Defense facilities, facilities regulated by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, or EPA regulated public water
systems and wastewater treatment facilities (MTSA
facilities may soon fall under CFATS as per H.R. 2828 to
be discussed later).
Facilities identified by DHS as falling under
CFATS must complete a screening process for potentially
dangerous materials, identifying their vulnerabilities
through a security vulnerability assessment (SVA) and
then, pursuant to that assessment, developing a site
security plan (SSP). This process was designed to narrow
down the more than 32,000 facilities that were determined
to meet the thresholds of the
different COis. 7,000 facilities
were required to submit an SVA.
This assessment was designed to
rank each of the facilities, based
on a classified set of criteria, into a
four-tier structure with facilities
with the highest levels of CO Is
and vulnerabilities into tier one
and those with the lowest into tier 4. According to DHS,
as of July 2009 195 facilities have been assigned to Tier 1,
678 facilities to Tier II, 609 facilities to Tier III, and 3,918
facilities to Tier IV. Tier I facilities were notified in May
2009 of their status and now are required to submit a Site
Security Plan (SSP).
The SSP is based upon eighteen risk based
performance standards (RBPS). These standards were
explicitly set by Congress with the intent of allowing each
individual facility the flexibility to address their own
Fall2009

unique security challenges. These performance standards,
versus dictated standards, help to increase the overall
security of the entire industry since the security
implemented by each individual facility will differ,
presenting a new and unique challenge to any one
attempting to penetrate the security measures. Each of the
four tiers has a specific set of standards to meet, ranging
from a the very strict standards ofTier I to the more
relaxed, yet still secure, Tier IV standards. The eighteen
RBPSs range from perimeter security, shipping and
receiving, theft, cyber, monitoring, training, reporting,
response, and records.
As the first RBPS listed in
the Guidance provided to
facilities , perimeter security is the
literal first, physical line of
defense. As such, it is imperative
that facility security implementors
be educated about the newest, and
best intrusion detection systems including fiber-based
fencing, video analytics and radar detection. Another issue
is going to be cost for many of these facilities. These
facilities must take advantage of the flexibility given them
by DHS and Congress and become creative in their
approach to meeting the threshold standards set by the tier
assigned to them. Qual-tron, Inc. provides compact,
lightweight, portable intrusion detection systems that can
assist with facilities to reach their threshold standards at
lower costs than some traditional security measures (such
as fences) would require. This is just one example of
using creativity to achieve the results required by CFATS.
This can be especially cost effective when a Tier 1 facility
is collocated with a Tier 3 facility and avoid a large capital
outlay for erecting fencing estimated at $3,900,000 versus
a $250,000 by one petrochemical operator. Their solutions
are especially effective a petrochemical facilities in remote
locations.
Once SSPs have been developed and implemented,
DHS will conduct regular, surprise visits of all CFATS
facilities , with Tier I facilities being inspected more
frequently. These inspections will help DHS ensure
compliance of the high-risk chemical facilities and
promote the highest level of security possible. Another
measure implemented by some petrochemical operators is
to conduct surprise detection and interdiction by canine
patrols. American K-9 provides canine surveillance for
See K-9 Pg. 12
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K-9 /continued from pg. 11

illegal drug and explosives possession for petrochemical
CFATS, as well as federal, corporate, and community
institutions. All canine teams are trained and certified to
federal standards. American K-9 works in partnership with
the petrochemical operators along with homeland defense
organizations, law enforcement, and corporate security
departments to provide safe workplace environments and
public facilities. Another security practice is the use of K -9
patrols for incoming feedstock for the detection and
interdiction of contraband such as explosives and illicit
drugs.
The current CFATS authorization expires on
October 20, 2009. There are currently two bills in the

House of Representatives to reauthorize CFATS. H.R.
24 77 would merely extend the authorization of the existing
interim CFATS legislation through October 1, 2012. H.R.
2868 would revise the current legislation. The bill
includes new provisions for inherently safer technology
requirements for Tier I and Tier II facilities. It also would
require facilities currently regulated by the Maritime
Transportation Safety Act of2002 (MTSA) to submit
screening information to see ifthey would fall under
CFATS. If so, then they would be required to revise its
vulnerability assessments and facility security plans to
comply with CFATS requirements as well as MTSA.

AMK9

12

AMERICAN K-9 DETECT ION SERV ICES
tf

fAi>l

l

\\I ''I OF WORI

WID£ Sf (' ll

Fall2009

TERRORISM

LAW

REPORT

Professor Addicott testifies before the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and
the Courts hearing entitled: "What Went Wrong: Torture and
the Office ofthe Legal Counsel in the Bush Administration,"
Washington, DC, on May 12, 2009.

Professor Addicott
answers questions from
a student at a Federalist
Society presentation on
the Obama
Administration's
approach to the War on
Terror before the St.
Mary's Law student
body, October 8, 2009.

Former Mayor Henry
Cisneros and
Professor Addicott
answer questions
while moderating a
documentary entitled
The Third Jihad, which concerns the goals
and objectives of radical Islamic terrorism
targeted at Western democracies

Professor Addicott
speaks to attendees of
the Senior Executive
Seminar at the
George C. Marshall
European Center for
Security Studies,
GarmischPartenkirchen,
Germany, on
September 16, 2009.

New Research Fellows hit the
ground running as the start of the
year for the Center brings numerous
new projects, to include establishing
a cyber law studies program, a
Cyber Security conference in March
2010, a Narco-Terrorism conference in coordination with Texas
A&M International University, and numerous papers and law
review articles to be published.
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Terrorism Around The World
Terrorism is pervasive in our world. It is not concentrated in one area or region. The field of Terrorism Law must keep
up with the ever-changing and evolving world that is before us. New developmen ts within the field of Terrorism Law
and throughout the world can drastically alter our understanding of what Terrorism Law is. For this reason, we will
highlight relevant developments and legal cases in "Terrorism Around the World."
Scotland Frees Lockerbie Bomber

On September 17, 2009 the man convicted for the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 was freed by Scotland on
compassionate grounds. Abdel Baset al-Megrahi, was diagnosed with prostate cancer and has been given only
months to live. He was convicted in 2001 for being a participant in the terrorist bombing that killed 270 people,
including 11 people that were on the ground when the airplane crashed in the town of Lockerbie, Scotland. The White
House did not agree with the decision of the Scottish government releasing Al-Megrahi, who only served eight years
of a life sentence. U.S. family members of the victims were outraged, as AI- Megrahi returned to Libya.
Marines Locate Insurgents' Underground Passages

U.S. Marines have begun investigating a series of tunnels in Afghanistan connected to a series of ancient wells known
as the Karez System. They are using both manpower and robots to observe the insides of these tunnels. These tunnels
have been around for hundreds to thousands of years. During the exploration of these connecting tunnels, Marines
have seen signs of human activity. Trash, weapons and lED-making materials have been found among other objects.
These tunnels are and have been used by insurgents to hide and transport supplies The exploration of these tunnels has
drawn heavy attention, but the goal remains clear. The United States is finding better ways to cut the covert
transportation of supplies and movement of insurgents. The only problem is that the tunnel system cannot be
destroyed without ruining the farmers' means of irrigation in the area; so Marines are exploring other ways to solve
this problem.
Men Accused of Unrelated Bomb Plots in Illinois and Texas

Two men, who attempted to detonate what they thought were explosive devices, were arrested in unrelated incidents
~ust one day apart. Michael C. Flinton, also known as Talib Islam and a fanatic of the American-born Tali ban soldier
John Walker Lindh, was arrested on September 23, 2009 after he attempted to detonate a van with what he believed
were explosives, outside a federal courthouse in Springfield, Illinois. Jordanian national, Hosam Maher Husein
Smadi, was arrested on September 24, 2009 after he parked what he thought was a car bomb in the garage of a Dallas
skyscraper. Federal authorities stated that, in both incidents, FBI agents posing as AI Qaeda militants provided the
men with the decoy explosives.
Pentagon to Release Classified Terrorism-Related Materials

The Pentagon will soon release classified terrorism-related information to State and local agencies through what are
being called fusion centers. These centers were implemented in 2006, but were only for communication with the CIA
and FBI. The plan is to add State and local agencies to the Department of Homeland Security's Computer Network.
The Department of Homeland Security 's goal is to have these fusion centers in at least every State and major United
States city. The access for State and local agencies will only be preapproved to selected staff with federal security
clearances and will not include information on any specific United States citizens. The Department of Homeland

14
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Terrorism Around The World cant.
Security is confident that sharing information with these State and local agencies will prove beneficial in preventing
domestic terrorist attacks.
U.S. Releases More Uighur Detainees
The United States has successfully convinced another country, the island nation of Palau, to accept up to 8 of the
Uighur detainees from Guantanamo Bay. The release of these detainees has been a constant struggle since many
countries have refused to accept anyone from this group for fear of retaliation from China. Europe has refused to take
any unless the United States accepts some of the Uighurs, but this will not happen since the Supreme Court has
already decided in Kiyemba v. Obama that federal district court judges do not have the power to release detainees into
the United States. These particular detainees have been a source of controversy since they were cleared as nonterrorists and okayed for release by the Bush Administration. The controversy surrounding the United States' holding
of the detainees in Guantanamo Bay revolves around the fear that if the U.S. releases these detainees to China, China
will torture them.
Gadhafi and Chavez Sign Anti-Terrorism Declaration
On September 28, 2009, controversial leaders Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and Libyan dictator Moammar
Gadhafi, signed a declaration condemning the branding, by the Western powers, some struggles against colonial
oppression as terrorism. The declaration stated that both countries are against identifying valid struggles of "liberty
and self-determination" as terrorism, but that it is important to combat terrorism in all its forms. Gadhafi, for the last
40 years, has been accused of providing a haven for terrorists, allowing the existence of extremist training camps and
supporting terrorist attacks. Recently, Gadhafi has tried to take a more conciliatory approach with the West, and states
that his government rejects terrorism and should not be labeled as a supporter of terrorism. Both, Colombia and the
United States, have accused the Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez of aiding the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC), a military group that has been attempting to overthrow the Colombian government for the past 45
years.

Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 573 F.3d 835 (C.A.D.C. 2009)

The D.C. circuit court held on July 28, 2009 that the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia had jurisdiction
over a lawsuit filed against the Islamic Republic of Iran. Amir Reza Oveissi, the grandson of a former Iranian military
officer, brought action, under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act's (FSIA) state-sponsored terrorism exception,
against the Islamic Republic of Iran and its Ministry of Information and Security (MOIS), alleging intentional
infliction of emotional distress (liED) and wrongful death related to murder of his grandfather. The D.C. circuit court
established that at the time of the attack against Oveissi 's grandfather: Iran had been designated as state sponsor of
terrorism, the murder occurred outside Iran's borders, and Oveissi was a United States citizen; thus meeting the
necessary criteria to satisfy the FSIA's state sponsored terrorism exception.
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II. BUSH POLICIES ON AL-QA 'EDA, TALIBAN AND

ASSOCIATED FORCES

Following the al-Qa'eda terror attacks of September 11,
2001, the Bush Administration embarked on a series of
antiterrorism policy and legal initiatives designed to
disrupt the Islamic terror organization (and their affiliates)
and to prevent future terror attacks from taking place. The
most significant and crucial legal development advanced
by the Bush Administration was the clear view that the
conflict with al-Qa'eda was a real "war," to be fought not
only with the use of domestic federal criminal law, but
with the full power of the legal rules associated with the
law of war. Among other things, the premise that the
United States was at war served as the rule of law
justification to designate and detain without trial enemy
combatants, establish and use military commissions, and
interrogate illegal enemy combatants.
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Supreme Court never overturned the premise that the
United States was at war; therefore, the US was entitled to
detain enemy combatants.s
C. Military Commissions and Federal Courts
Military commissions are non-Article III courts. They
derive their authority from Congress' power to "define and
punish ... offenses against the Law ofNations."6 . Military
commissions are illegal unless the nation is or has been in
a state of armed conflict under the law of war. Under the
Bush Administration, three al-Qa'eda fighters were tried
by military commission and sentenced.
D. Interrogation of Detainees

Since the Bush Administration determined that the
Third Geneva Convention did not apply to the detainees,
American authorities were entitled to conduct
A. The War on Terror
interrogations so long as said questioning was conducted
free oftorture or ill-treatment.? With the passage ofthe
The first action taken following the terrorist attacks of
September 11,2001, was the Bush Administration's
Detainee Treatment Act in 2005, 8 additional uniform
pronouncement that the United States was at "war." In
standards for interrogation were set out which expressly
tandem with this determination from the Commander in
prohibited cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of
Chief, the phrase "War on Terror" entered the lexicon of
detainees in the custody of any U.S. agency. Then, in
both the general public and all branches of the
2006, the Supreme Court in Hamdan v. RumsfelcP held
government, where it remained firmly set for the next
that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions did in
seven years.
fact apply to the detainees and protected them from
violence, outrages on personal dignity, torture, and cruel,
Congress identified the enemy in the War on Terror and
10 The so-called
voted on September 18,2001, to authorize the President to humiliating, or degrading treatment.
"water boarding" interrogation technique used on three aluse armed force against "those nations, organizations, or
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or Qa'eda detainees in the CIA program was determined to
constitute a level of force that did not rise to the level of
aided the terrorist attacks" against the United States on
torture under the Torture Convention. 11
September 11,2001.
B. Designating and Detaining Enemy Combatants

Ill. 0BAMAPOLICIES ON AL-QA'EDA, TALIBAN, AND
ASSOCIATED FORCES

In conjunction with the War on Terror, the Bush
Administration designated certain individuals as enemy
President Obama's desire to dismantle key elements of
combatants and detained them indefinitely. Under the law the Bush policies first came about vis a vis three executive
of armed conflict an enemy combatant can be held
orders issued on January 22, 2009. The President
indefinitely until the war is over.3 The Bush
mandated: ( 1) the closure of the Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
Administration determined that the al-Qa'eda and Taliban detention facility within one year's time; 12 (2) the
fighters were not eligible for prisoner of war (POW) status suspension of all ongoing military commissions; 13 and (3)
under the Third Geneva Convention. Since al-Qa'eda
the suspension of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
fighters belonged to a terrorist organization and were not
program. 14
recognized members of an armed force, they were deemed
unlawful belligerents.4 During the Bush years, the U.S.
See OVERSEAS Pg. 17
16
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OVERSEAS I continued from pg. 16

A. Overseas Contingency Operations

these fighters are in fact illegal enemy combatants and
subject to the law of war. This confusion and lack of
clarity only provides fuel for our enemies to perpetuate the
Wishing to establish a new theme to describe the war,
President Obama substituted the phrase War on Terror with false propaganda that America is acting illegally by, for
example, detaining enemy combatants without trial and
the new label: "Overseas Contingency Operations."
Unfortunately, the phrase failed to include the most critical conducting military commissions. Ifthe events of9/ll
have taught us anything it is that the United States must
element of all: the word "war." This is a fundamental
utilize the rule of law set out in the law of war. America
ingredient that provides the clearest signal that the nation
should make this application of the rule of law crystal
is using the law of war against al-Qa'eda and Taliban
forces .
clear.
B. Interrogation of Detainees
President Obama publicly asserted that CIA waterboarding was torture but then refused to take any action
against those who authorized or carried out the
technique. 15 Under the Torture Convention, President
Obama was faced with a choice to either extradite the
alleged torturer to a State that will prosecute or submit
them for prosecution in the U.S. As of this time, he has
refused to do either.

IV.

CONCLUSION

* Distinguished Professor of Law and Director, Center for Terrorism
Law, St. Mary's University School of Law. B.A. (with honors).
1 BUCKNER F. MELTON, JR., THE QUOTABLE FOUNDING FATHERS 199
(2004) .
2 President Obama's address to a Joint Session of Congress. 2/24/09.
3 Traditional law of war authority allows the government to hold
enemy combatants until the end of hostilities. See Article 118 of
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
4 Army Field Manual (FM) 27-10 codifies the law of land warfare.
5 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
6 Article I US Constitution.
7 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment. U.N. Res. 39/46 (1984).
8 The Detainee Treatment Act of2005 was part of the Department of

Defense Appropriations Act of2006 (Title X, H.R. 2863).
Supra note 38.
10 !d.
11 See, e.g. , Professor Addicott's May 2009 testimony before the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Administrative
Oversight and the Courts hearing entitled: " What Went Wrong Torture
and the Office of the Legal Counsel in the Bush Administration,"
Washington, DC.
12 Executive Order - (1122/09); Executive Order - (1122/09) .
13 !d.
14 Executive Order - (1/22/09).
15 Associated Press. (2009, April 17).
9

The War on Terror is a real war against al-Qa'eda,
Taliban, and associated forces. As the Commander in
Chief, it is imperative that President Obama communicates
this fact to the American people and the world. At the very
center of the problem is the Obama Administration's
refusal to publicly call the conflict a war while
simultaneously arguing to federal district court judges
receiving petitions from detainees held in Afghanistan that
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MEXICO I continued from pg. 3

keenly aware of Mexico as a transit point
or conduit to the U.S. because of certain
conditions and existing "support" entities
that exist in Mexico. We'll discuss some
ofthem shortly.
Shaikh Abdullah ai-Nasifi, a Kuwaiti
professor and AQ recruiter was seen on
an AI-Jezeera television video in
February of this year speaking of a
WMD attack on a major U.S.
metropolitan target that could cause the
death of hundreds ofthousands of
Americans and make 9/11 seem
insignificant. In that speech, ai-Nafisi
specifically mentions Mexico as the
logical transit point into the U.S for such
an attack.
When Kalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM),
the notorious mastermind ofthe 9111
attacks was captured, interrogated and
debriefed over an extended period of
time, McAllen, Texas on the U.S./
Mexico border and numerous references
to Mexico were found in his documents
and mentioned in his interviews.
AQ suspect, Adnan ai-Shukrijumah,
who took flight lessons in Florida along
with the 9/11 hijackers and is considered
by many as the 20 1h hijacker, remains at
large and his whereabouts are unknown.
It is known through investigation, that alShukrijumah did pass through Panama
on a Trinidad and Tobago passport in
2001.

Virginia and two of the World Trade
Center bombers in 1993 were also
illegally in the U.S. DHS intelligence
conservatively estimates that there are
over 115,000 Middle-Easterners are in
the U.S. illegally and over 6,000 have
defied deportation orders and remain on
the loose.

MEXICO
Mexico represents a unique, twopronged counterterrorism challenge.
Although there are only about 6,000
Muslims in Mexico and only four
principle Muslim communities, they are
fairly well organized, funded by Saudi
Arabia, Pakistan and Iran as well as other
global Islamic groups and remain
committed to the Muslim principle of
spreading the Da 'wa (missionary word
oflslam) throughout the country. Of
greater concern to terrorism officials in
Mexico is the overwhelming presence of
sophisticated, global human smuggling
networks that exist and utilize Mexico as
the final staging point for the movement
of illegal aliens across the U.S./Mexican
border and into the U.S.

notoriously known for his smuggling of
Hizballah operative, Mahmoud Kourani
Kourani, who is the
into the U.S.
brother of Haider Kourani, Hizballah 's
operations chief of military security in
Lebanon, was captured by the FBI in
Detroit, Michigan in 2003 in possession
of large amount of Hizballah j ihadist
materials and video tapes.
Mohammed Kamel Ibrahim and
Sampson Lovelace Boateng successfully
ran an east African human smuggling
pipeline through Belize and into the U.S
for about five years until they were shut
down and arrested in 2008. This
operation ran along with the help of a
corrupt Mexican consulate official in
Belize who would provide Mexican visas
for entry into Mexico. Once in Mexico,
the Africans were staged for smuggling
into the U.S. by the vast array of
"coyote" smuggling operations that exist
in Mexico. The smuggling of east
Africans is of concern to
counterterrorism officials because AQ
has increased its presence and influence
in east Africa in recent years, particularly
in Somalia (al-Shabab) and the Sudan.

Throughout the 1990's, George Tajirian,
an Iraqi and naturalized Mexican citizen
and his Babylonian Travel Agency in
Mexico City, provided false documents
and smuggled thousands ofPalestinians,
Syrians, Iraqis and other MiddleEasterners and south Asians into the U.S.
until his arrest and sentencing of 13
years in a U.S. prison.

IRAN and HIZBALLAH
Hizballah, the "party of God" has always
been the world's most prolific terror
group. Founded in 1982, in response to
the Israeli invasion of south Lebanon, it
is the most organized and best funded
terror group with global reaching
operations. As a proxy for the Iranians
Numerous detainees and terror suspects
and, to a lesser extent, the Syrians, it
interviewed at GITMO as well as
Salim Boughader Musharraf, a Lebanese receives millions in direct funding and
detention facilities in Iraq and
human smuggler who owned the
arms each year. Estimates are that
Afghanistan have made references to
Lebanon Cafe in Tijuana, Mexico
Hizballah
raises over $100 million per
Mexico and Latin-America.
smuggled hundreds of Lebanese into
year through it global web of fundsouthern California until his operation
raising and criminal activities. Most of
It is difficult to talk about Mexico and
was finally shut down in 2003 and he
that money comes from its sophisticated,
the 2,000 mile border without talking
was
sent
away
for
14
years.
mafia-like criminal enterprises that
about illegal immigration, human
Interestingly, a key figure in his
specialize in counterfeiting everything
smuggling and the link to terrorism.
operation
was
the
Mexican
Consul
from U.S. currency and documents to
Anecdotally, it's interesting to note that
General in Beirut, Lebanon, Imelda Ortiz blue jeans, perfumes, DVD's, CD's and
three of the 9111 hijackers were illegal
computer software. We know AQ and
overstays, seven of the nineteen hijackers Abdullah, arrested by Mexican
authorities
but
then
suddenly
released
its affiliates have been on the forefront of
bought fraudulent ID cards from
two years later by a Mexican judge for
Hispanic day-laborers in northern
See HIZBALLAH Pg. 19
lack of evidence. Boughader was
18
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HIZBALLAH I continued (rom pg. 18

the terror radar screen but prior to 9/11,
Hizballah had the blood of more
Americans on its hands than any other
terror group in the world going all the
way back to the bombings of embassies,
kidnappings and assassinations of
Americans in the early 1980's in Beirut
and Kuwait to the Marine Corp
barracks, TWA 840, the LaBelle disco in
Berlin, Khobar towers and, in some intel
circles, a hand in the bombing ofPanAm
103.

police and intelligence services. The
consistent variable always found in the
final analysis, as was the case in the
Buenos Aires bombings, is that of
Iranian "diplomatic" presence. The
Islamic theocracy of Iran is deemed a
state sponsor of terror since 1984
because Iranian intelligence agents and
Hizballah posing as diplomats have
successfully conducted bombings,
kidnappings, and assassinations around
the world. General Amad Vahidi, former
commander of the Iranian Revolutionary
In the southern cone of South America,
Guard operations wing, was a principle
Hizballah was responsible for the
player and has been indicted in the 1994
carnage of both the Israeli Embassy
Jewish Community Center bombing in
bombing in 1992 and the Jewish
Buenos Aires. He is a fugitive from
Community Center bombing in 1994 in
justice and wanted on an INTERPOL
Buenos Aires, Argentina. Both were
warrant by both Argentine and British
classic Hizballah operations; PETN/
authorities. Iranian President
RDX truck bombs against somewhat soft Ahmadinijad just named Vahidi last
symbolic targets in retaliation for the
month the new Minister of Defense in
Israeli assassination of Hizballah leaders Iran.
in Lebanon.
Beyond Latin-America's southern cone,
Just to the north of Buenos Aires, the
the growing presence of Iran and
notorious tri-border region of Brazil,
Hizballah operations throughout LatinArgentina and Paraguay is the western
America and reaching literally right into
headquarters ofHizballah, a region that
our own "backyard" is of increasing
25,000 Lebanese Arabs call home.
concern. The growing "love fest"
Located in a remote lawless area with
between Iran's President Mahmoud
uncontrolled borders and rampant
Ahmadinijad and Venezuela's President/
corruption, it is designated a commercial Dictator Hugo Chavez has been
"free port" zone. It is considered the
memorialized in various press photos
smuggling capital of the world and
throughout Latin-America. A
estimates are that over $1 00 Million in
relationship, based in part on a mutual
counterfeit goods generated each year
disdain for the U.S., their actions have
end up in the coffers of Hizballah.
become more than just a "poke in the
eye" for Uncle Sam. Ahmadinijad is
Beyond presence and fundraising,
exploiting the ever growing left-of-center
Hizballah maintains logistical support in
governments in Latin-America and is
Latin-America with access to explosives,
wooing them with all kinds of promises.
arms, false documents, cloned cell
He has established growing Iranian
phones and stolen vehicles; all critical
diplomatic missions and embassies in
elements in terrorist operations. It has
Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, Chile,
also been determined that Hizballah
Colombia, Uruguay and, most notably,
maintains a robust intelligence collection
with left wing leader and former U.S.
process in Latin-America with direct ties
nemesis, Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua.
to Iranian intelligence.
Shrewdly, the Iranians are exploiting
their
presence in Nicaragua, one of the
Endemic to many parts of Latinpoorest countries in Central America
America, Hizballah is known to exploit
where electricity is rationed and the
regions where there are weak and poor
Fall2009

average person may live on $2 a day.
Ahamdinijad has promised the
Nicaraguans, schools, hospital, power
plants, dams, new ports on the Caribbean
side and over $1 Billion dollars in aid.
Of course, none of these projects have
materialized but the Iranians have built
their largest Embassy in Latin-America
in Managua with over 150 diplomats,
most of whom were never registered
with the Nicaraguan government
according to a La Pres a media
investigation in Managua. When
interviewed recently by a journalist as to
why Iran would establish such a broadbased presence in Central America, I
cynically replied that I didn't think it was
because the Iranians had an interest in
becoming banana farmers.

Conclusion
From a macro-perspective,
counterterrorism experts will always say
the threat of AQ and AQ-inspired groups
remain the primary terror threat to our
national security. Nonetheless, when we
consider the exploitation of our vast and
porous southern border global smuggling
groups, the threat of the growing
presence of Iran and Hizballah in LatinAmerica, the resume and modus
operandi of Hizballah terrorist
operations around the globe coupled with
the current saber-rattling over the Iranian
nuclear issue increasing tensions in the
Middle-East, Washington policy makers
may want to reconsider and refocus our
counterterrorism efforts from the
"backwaters" of Pakistan and
Afghanistan to that of our own
"backyard".

James G. Conway, Jr. is President and
Managing Director of Global Intelligence
Strategies, Inc., a Houston-based firm that
consults, advises and trains government
agencies, academia and the media on
terrorism and national security matters as
well as private sector corporations on
security issues, counter-terrorism measures
and risk mitigation. Mr. Conway, a retired
FBI, Special Agent, was a former manger of
counterterrorism operations for the FBI in
Latin-America.
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WHAT WE ARE DOING ...
The Center for Terrorism Law is conducting a symposium entitled Cyber Security: Legal and Policy Issues for
ational Security, Law Enforcement and Private Industry. It will be held at St. Mary's School of Law from March
18th thru 19th, 20 I 0. The purpose of the symposium is to provide information on a full range of issues, both legal and
policy, related to cyber security, as well as actionable information regarding cyber security solutions and future trends.
See www.stmar tx.edu/ctl for additional details. Seating is strictly limited to 200.
Six Main Conference Themes:
• An overview of what is a cyber threat posed by nation-states and terrorist groups
• Analysis of cyber threats specific to American business that is part of"critical infrastructure"
• Current mechanisms for dealing with cyber attacks from law enforcement perspective
• Cyber sec.urity between the government and private sector
• Review of national security doctrine and tools to conduct cyber warfare
• Legal field's development of"cyber premises liability" for businesses that suffered attack
The Center for Terrorism Law ...
•

•

•

•
•
•
•

is developing a Cyber Studies Department to better approach the complex study of legal issues associated
with cyberspace. It will be housed in the Center for Terrorism Law. In addition, the Center is also
developing a section of the website to help the public with research in the area of terrorism law with
existing case law, statutes, and other pertinent information.
continues to coordinate with the American Embassy Kuwait regarding the development of a university
level (for academic credit) course at the American University of Kuwait on legal and policy matters related
to terrorism. The tentative date for the Kuwait based event is 2009.
continues to coordinate cyber training initiatives with the Center for Infrastructure Assurance and Security
(CIAS) at the University ofTexas San Antonio as well as the Cyber Innovation and Research Consortium,
San Antonio, Texas.
as a participating member of the FBI's Terrorism Research and Analysis Project (TRAP), is preparing an
article for publication entitled: Radical Islam's Manipulation of the Media.
is coordinating with Texas A&M International University to help develop an agenda for a national
conference on Narco-terrorism to be held in 20 I 0 in Laredo, Texas.
is preparing a law review article for the Southern New England School of Law regarding the need for
international adoption of civil litigation to deter international terrorism .
is currently working on an article, Terrorist Manipulation of the Media, being written by Center research
fellows Rob Gunn and Nathaniel Fulmer, in conjunction with Professor Addicott.

Professor Addicott will have an article published in the Pace Law Review entitled Efficacy of the Obama Policies to
Combat Al-Qa'eda, Taliban, and Associated Forces-The First Six Months in January 20 I 0.
On October 18, 2009 at 7pm, Professor Addicott and former Mayor Henry Cisneros moderated a documentary entitled:
The Third Jihad, at the Bijou Theater, 5422 Fredericksburg Road, San Antonio, Texas. The documentary concerns the
goals and objectives of radical Islamic terrorism targeted at Western democracies. For more information, please email
i arodfei sbc lobal.net.
On October 8, 2009, Professor Addicott addressed the World Affairs Council of San Antonio. The topic covered the
Obama Administration's Approach to the War on Terror.
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